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T his study offers a utility framework to identify assets for deployment into humanitarian assistance and disaster relief(HADR) operations. We focus on attributes of the hard assets: capabilities for humanitarian missions, proximity to
the affected area, and cost to the organization. We demonstrate the importance of this framework using the case of the
United States Navy (USN). On a broader level, we offer a strategy for the decision makers to deploy appropriate assets
for executing HADR smartly. Such a method, when employed with relevant data, can enhance efficiency for various orga-
nizations involved in HADR, whether military or not. We collected a large amount of data on the assets, specifically ships,
of the USN. This collected data alone are a contribution to the literature. We use factor analysis to reduce the dimension-
ality and make the dataset manageable while simultaneously retaining the variation and maximal information in the data.
Our results, in this case, show that planners need to consider costs to truly maximize utility, especially in cases where
two assets, or a combination of them, have similar utility ratings but significantly different costs. Our findings also
demonstrate that asset capabilities, proximity, and the duration of an HADR response matter. Finally, we employ our
framework to illustrate how HADR responses to the 2010 Haiti and 2011 Tohoku earthquakes could have been conducted
more effectively and efficiently.
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1. Introduction
As primary responders to disasters around the world,
certain organizations serve to mitigate the conse-
quences of the disaster by providing supplies and ser-
vices to the affected population. However, in addition
to the demands and needs of the affected population,
the organization’s responses are also based on their
established protocols and core competencies that
depend on their resources. How organizations utilize
such resources are at the heart of the efficiency and
efficacy of the humanitarian operations.
We, in this article, offer a framework to illustrate
the tradeoffs between attributes of the resources of an
organization, humanitarian or military, that provides
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)
to the affected region. We demonstrate the impor-
tance of this framework in enhancing the efficiency
and efficacy of humanitarian operations using data
from the United States Navy (USN).
Our motivation for developing such a framework is
to help plan for disaster relief after the decision has
already been made to respond based on the protocols
of various organizations. The framework does not fac-
tor in the decision of whether or not to intervene. We
state this explicitly because protocols exist for various
organizations involved in humanitarian missions. In
the case of the USN, while HADR is one of their mar-
itime strategies, it is only once the USN has made the
decision to respond that the actual operations can
benefit from our framework. From our perspective of
tradeoffs between the assets for execution of the
humanitarian mission, the framework we offer
applies after an organization has resolved to provide
HADR.
Our research is in the same tradition as articles that
have developed models and then used actual data
from specific organizations, such as data from Inter-
national Federation of the Red Cross, as input to the
models by Pedraza-Martinez and Van Wassenhove
(2013) and Stauffer et al. (2016). While our illustrative
focus is on the efficiency and efficacy of the humani-
tarian missions conducted by the USN, our utility
framework certainly applies to organizations beyond
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the USN. The issue we deal with in this study is
important not just for the USN and humanitarian
organizations, but also for the population that will be
affected in the future due to disasters.
In our utility framework, the attributes of the hard
assets that we focus on are capabilities for humanitar-
ian missions, proximity to the affected area, and cost
to the organization. Militaries of other nations
engaged in disaster relief and humanitarian organiza-
tions all have hard assets with multiple attributes and
capabilities, some of which are more proximate than
others to a disaster, and whose costs vary. For exam-
ple, there were 29 foreign military forces present to
offer humanitarian aid to the Philippines after
typhoon Haiyan struck in 2013. All such military
organizations, with hard assets for humanitarian
operations whose attributes include cost, proximity,
and capabilities, will find our framework relevant in
planning their humanitarian missions. Our discus-
sions with United States Fleet Forces (USFF), the unit
that delivers HADR, indicates that it would be possi-
ble to share our framework with countries that they
support in HADR following the philosophy that, “in-
stead of giving [them] a fish, teach [them] how to
fish.”
Countries in the Asia-Pacific region are also increas-
ingly becoming involved in disaster relief missions.
This region is particularly important since it bears the
brunt of more than half of global disasters. An impor-
tant lesson to improve effectiveness is potential coop-
eration with the United States for building partner
capacity for HADR (Moroney et al. 2013). The United
States continues to support countries in the Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), including
the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. A
framework that works for USN HADR missions will
therefore help other navies as the USN supports and
helps them in their own plans. Discussing, coordinat-
ing, and practicing humanitarian aid operation with
nations throughout the Asia-Pacific region builds the
USN’s knowledge base of the capabilities of these
nations and also showcases the capabilities the USN
itself is able to provide. Vulnerabilities displayed by
developing countries exposed to natural disasters
drive the need for the efficient and effective execution
of HADR.
Apart from militaries outside the United States,
humanitarian organizations such as Doctors without
Borders, World Food Program (WFP) worldwide,
CAL-FIRE, and food banks in the United States can
benefit from this framework. The better prepared all
the organizations that support the humanitarian oper-
ations are, the better will be the efficacy and efficiency
of the disaster relief. All these organizations have
ongoing aid programs where assets with multiple
attributes and capabilities are being used. Similar to
USN, such organizations will need to reroute or redi-
rect these resources once they make the decision to
aid in a disaster. While the particular attributes of
each of these organization’s hard assets for humani-
tarian operations may differ from the three we con-
sider—capability, proximity, and cost of the vessels
used in disaster relief, our framework can be general-
ized to aid in their decisions by controlling the param-
eters. Our contribution is in acknowledging and
analyzing the tradeoffs among multiple attributes of
assets employed in humanitarian operations. In turn,
accounting for these tradeoffs will enable decision
makers to allocate their assets.
We focus on capability, proximity, and cost of
the vessels used in disaster relief to understand the
tradeoffs between these attributes. We focus on the
capability of ships because it affects the efficacy of
the relief, and we focus on proximity because it
affects efficacy as well as efficiency due to transit
time. Time, in such cases, always means money
since the fuel costs are very high for ships afloat.
Certain critical operations such as search and res-
cue and vertical lift, which are unique capabilities
of the USN, are quite expensive (Apte and Yoho
2017). For these reasons, it is important that the
costs of deployment or diversion of ships are man-
aged properly.
Our contribution to the larger operations literature
is thus multifold. On a broader level, we offer a
methodology for decision makers to deploy appropri-
ate assets for executing HADR smartly. Such a
method can be used, with certain modifications, by
other militaries and various Humanitarian Organiza-
tions. In addition, we collected a large amount of data
on the assets, ships of the USN, Military Sealift Com-
mand (MSC), and Ready Reserve Forces (RRF). This
collected data alone are a contribution to the literature
since researchers now have access to it. As the litera-
ture reviewed below reveals, the methodology we use
—factor analysis—has not been used for humanitar-
ian operations to develop a utility function for attri-
bute tradeoffs, a decision-making tool.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 lays out the related literature and their relevant
findings. Section 3 discusses our data collection, the
rationale for employing factor analysis, and our con-
struction of the utility function. Section 4 makes use
of this data, discusses our findings, and considers the
tradeoffs between capability, proximity, and cost of
naval vessels. We also consider two specific disasters
to illustrate how assets could have been more opti-
mally allocated using our framework and data. Our
findings highlight the different solutions characteriz-
ing the tradeoff between different attributes, but we
do not necessarily prescribe a solution. Finally, Sec-
tion 5 concludes the article.
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2. Literature Survey
For this research, we study resource allocation in the
aid of natural disasters by a humanitarian organiza-
tion, the USN. For our empirical analysis, we employ
big data tools and construct a utility function to
explore tradeoffs among the capabilities, proximity,
and costs of these resources. In this section, we review
relevant articles and surveys of empirical research in
operations as well as different methodologies of arti-
cles published on HADR. We also review articles on
resource allocation in natural and manmade disasters
and articles at the cross-roads of humanitarian logis-
tics and empirical analysis to link our work with the
related existing literature.
Many articles have been published based on empir-
ical research in operations management, of which
humanitarian operations is a focused area. Research-
ers have conducted surveys on the diversity of objec-
tives of the research, data collection, and data
analysis. Gupta et al. (2006) classify the empirical
research articles on similar principles. The authors
find that 38.8% of the articles published in Productions
and Operations Management (POM) during 1992–2005
were based on emergency response. Ten years later,
there have been many research papers published in
major journals on the topic of HADR. Gupta et al.
(2016) offer a macro-level map of HADR research.
The authors map the disaster management research
on five attributes: (i) disaster management functions,
(ii) time of disaster, (iii) types of disasters, (iv) data
type, and (v) data analysis techniques. Our research
focuses on disaster management using the methodol-
ogy of big data and statistical analysis.
There are many articles published on the topic of
resource allocation or utilization. However, we
focused our attention on the ones that related to
HADR. Most of the articles we reviewed used opti-
mization models. Although our study focuses on nat-
ural disasters, we also looked at the resources
deployed for manmade disasters, such as terrorist
attacks or bioterrorism, for understanding method-
ologies used since in either case humanitarian assis-
tance has to be delivered. Review of these articles
informed us of the scope of optimization models.
Liberatore et al. (2011) use a stochastic optimization
model to allocate resources among facilities. The
authors examine a manmade disaster, a terroristic
attack to the infrastructure, and develop the model to
minimize a worst-case impact. The computational
experiment offers insight into such situations.
Golany et al. (2007) discuss the probabilistic or
strategic risk on sites from terroristic attacks in a model
for allocating resources to mitigate such a problem. The
authors conclude that under probabilistic risk, the
optimal policy is to focus the allocation to a priority
location, whereas under strategic risk, it is best to
spread the resources to reduce the potential damage.
However, neither of these policies aligns with the com-
mon practice currently in use, which is to allocate
resources proportionately. We, in this research, contrast
the current policies of the USN based on which ships
are deployed vs. the tradeoffs of these assets.
Berman et al. (2012) discuss the allocation of lim-
ited emergency resources, in the case of a bioterrorism
attack at an airport terminal. The case study, which is
based on real data, adds to the insight of such a
situation.
Arora et al. (2010) discuss a resource allocation
model for mitigating demand surge of healthcare
resources in a large-scale public health emergency.
They find that developing the distribution from the
actual stockpile is optimal where smaller counties
benefit the most. The authors bring out the ethical
dilemmas for the allocation of resources through the
objective function of their model. The ethical dilem-
mas play a role in the USN response as well; however,
in our research, we do not address this side.
Chacko et al. (2014) look at multiple hazard sce-
nario for allocating resources. The authors claim that
such an approach is more effective in the context of
long-term planning and sustainability. The authors
also offer a review of existing models for the same.
Simultaneous disaster is one scenario that is difficult
to mitigate, yet the USN has encountered it many
times in the past.
Pinker (2007) models the joint optimization of
defenses using public warnings and deployment of
physical assets against terroristic attacks. The author
analyzes the interaction among these two resources.
The tradeoffs between the attributes of the resources
are noteworthy. The public warning system, although
cheap, may render false alarms, and the deployment
of physical assets though effective can be costly. This
particular research helped us understand the treat-
ment of tradeoffs in our research. The information we
gathered from the employment of optimization mod-
els used in the previously mentioned articles directed
us to explore other methodologies for performing
tradeoffs among attributes of the ships.
In addition to the analysis by Pinker (2007), our
research benefited from the discussion of capabilities
of USN ships that were deployed during HADR for
past disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami,
2005 Hurricane Katrina, and 2010 Haiti Earthquake
(Apte et al. 2013). Apte and Yoho (2017) further elabo-
rate on the costs of the humanitarian operations, indi-
cating that vertical lift is one of the most expensive
capabilities for the USN. Combining the findings of
these two articles, Apte and Yoho (2018) offer an
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optimization model that incorporates two of the attri-
butes, capability and cost of USN ships. In this
research, we push the research further to simultane-
ously incorporate capability, proximity to the disaster
location, and cost. We examine the tradeoffs between
these attributes through empirical analysis, particu-
larly factor analysis, formulating a utility function for
deploying USN ships.
We collected data to understand the attributes of all
the existing ships in the USN, MSC, and RRF. To help
us empirically analyze this big data, we reviewed the
following articles, which are at the crossroads of
humanitarian logistics and empirical analysis.
In this article, we focus on natural disasters. How-
ever, researchers have conducted empirical research
for manmade disasters as well. Jola-Sanchez et al.
(2016) offer a quantitative as well as qualitative model
that measures the effects of armed conflicts on public
rural hospitals.
Disaster impacts have grown exponentially (Sodhi
2016). After analyzing 50 years of data (1963–2012)
from 179 countries, Sodhi (2016) hypothesizes that the
population vulnerability of a country in the case of a
disaster affects the economy negatively in terms of
per capita income and the income growth. Given this,
it is all the more important to increase the humanitar-
ian assistance for underdeveloped countries.
One of the primary concerns among Humanitarian
Organizations (HO) responding to natural disasters is
needs assessment. van der Laan et al. (2016) followed
19 long-term aid projects and over 2000 medical items
consumed by Medecins Sans Frontieres in Operations
Center Amsterdam to better understand the forecast-
ing and order planning process. The authors analyze
the data through a forecasting method to provide an
empirical analysis of demand planning and distribu-
tion operations. They also offer a statistical analysis of
forecasting performance.
Morrice et al. (2016) use regression methods to help
develop an inventory model for demand during hur-
ricanes. The authors triangulate their sources of data:
a large dataset of point-of-sales from Texas Gulf Coast
retailers, the retailer’s operational and logistical con-
straints, and the hurricane forecast data from the
National Hurricane Center. Similar to Salmeron and
Apte (2010), Rawls and Turnquist (2010), and Lodree
et al. (2012), who use two-stage stochastic optimiza-
tion models for prepositioning, Morrice et al. (2016)
use a recourse model to allocate inventory by the
retailer as the path of the hurricane gets more precise.
Ballesteros et al. (2017) claim that in the case of a dis-
aster, some private sector companies may recognize
needs and respond quickly by seizing opportunities
and reconfiguring the resources. The traditional provi-
ders of disaster relief may not be able to move so fast
and adapt dynamically. The authors choose the
synthetic control method for their analysis, which is a
quasi-experimental technique that can mitigate some
of the limitations of customary matching approaches.
The technique matches a focal entity with a control that
is statistically similar for a set of relevant predictors,
but different with regard to a focal independent vari-
able. Such analysis may force the HOs to examine their
policies for resource allocation tradeoffs between speed
of delivery and quality of delivery; this analysis also
prompted us to look at the policies and delivery by the
USN, a provider of humanitarian relief, more closely.
Bastian et al. (2016) develop a framework for
HADR in a military environment for aerial delivery
operations. Their framework is a multi-criteria cost
assessment model which provides possible solutions
for decision makers to explore tradeoffs between effi-
ciency and responsiveness of the aerial delivery of
supplies.
Meanwhile, factor analysis is a well-developed sta-
tistical technique employed across many quantitative
applications using big data to reduce its dimensional-
ity and construct meaningful aggregate metrics. In
contrast to multivariate regression analysis, in which
there is a response, outcome, or dependent variable,
the goal in factor analysis is usually to identify the
latent variables (factors) underlying a relatively large
set of measured variables. In its seminal application,
Spearman (1904) used factor analysis to develop a
measure of general intelligence “g” using school chil-
dren’s test performance on a wide variety of subjects.
The literature on factor analysis is extensive, to say
the least, with a variety of applications and refine-
ments across the physical, biological, and social
sciences research.
For this reason, we limit our discussion to specific
examples. For instance, dynamic factor analysis is
used to reduce the dimensionality of 58 measures of
quarterly US economic activity (real sectoral indus-
trial production, employment, sales, income, etc.) into
a single aggregate factor (Stock and Watson 2016).
Multiple other economists continue to make impor-
tant contributions to construct meaningful monetary
aggregates.
As another example, Heckman and many others
employ factor analysis to represent person-specific
cognitive and non-cognitive traits (e.g., Conti et al.
2014, Cunha et al. 2010, Heckman et al. 2006). Baco-
lod and Blum (2010) use the methodology to investi-
gate the gender gap. As mentioned, the literature is
extensive. Factor analysis can be implemented in sev-
eral statistical programs such as R, Stata, and SAS,
and the method is also discussed in standard statisti-
cal textbooks. For our research, we use factor analysis
so that we can condense all available ship information
into interpretable aggregates for use as arguments in
an HADR utility function.
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Although we use extensive data from USN to vali-
date/illustrate our framework our focus is not only
on maritime operations. Research published in the
topic of humanitarian operations has utilized data
from specific organizations or disasters. For example,
International Federation of the Red Cross as input to
the models in case of (Pedraza-Martinez and Van
Wassenhove, 2013, Stauffer et al. 2016), specific disas-
ter such as anticipated earthquake in Istanbul (Yi and
Ozdamar 2007), and specific mode of transportation
such as helicopter logistics (Barbarosoglu et al. 2002).
Some of the articles use names of specific organiza-
tions in the title as well (Baker et al. 2002, Pedraza-
Martinez and Van Wassenhove, 2013, Yi and Ozda-
mar 2007).
The USN has responded to many natural disaster
events that have resulted in scores of casualties and
millions of dollars in damages, and have taken years
to rebuild. The USN has diverted ships from original
missions 366 times for humanitarian assistance, as
opposed to 22 times for combat, from the years 1979
to 2000, according to fact sheets from USAID and
Center for Naval Analysis.
The response to these disasters seems to be reac-
tionary based on the data of past disasters. The disas-
ters we refer to are but a few of the major disasters in
the last 15 years: the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that
devastated the coast of Sumatra, the 2010 earthquake
in Haiti that debilitated the country, and the Tohoku
earthquake in Japan in 2011 that morphed into crisis.
During each of these disasters, the USN committed
assets with its unique capabilities (Greenfield and
Ingram 2011, Herbert et al. 2012, Kaczur et al. 2012,
Roughead et al. 2013, Ures 2011).
For a while, the HADR mission was considered one
of the key areas of engagement and a critical opera-
tional mission performed by the USN (Kaplan 2007).
In 2010, the DoD incorporated HADR into its Qua-
drennial Defense Review, which is a legislatively
mandated review of DoD strategy and priorities.
HADR was identified in the 2015 National Security
Strategy as a core part of strengthening US national
defense. The USN has been one of the primary provi-
ders of HADR whenever protocol permits. Cost-effec-
tiveness does not seem to be a priority in any of the
decisions for humanitarian missions (Grieskpoor
et al. 1999). A “send everything and we will figure
out how to pay for it” approach has been the USN’s
policy in the past (Moffat 2014). An important prob-
lem is whether the USN will be able to continue to
sustain humanitarian operations in the current envi-
ronment of fiscal austerity (Apte et al. 2013, Roug-
head et al. 2013).
The concept of utility function is a classic approach
in econometrics. In our review of the literature,
although we saw some aspects of our motivation and
methodology in other researchers’ work, we did not
encounter a study that exploited factor analysis to for-
mulate a HADR utility function in an effort to help
decision makers navigate tradeoffs.
3. The Data and Methodology
The objective of our data collection and development
of the utility function can be best explained by the
illustration in Figure 1. As can be seen, there are ships
at various locations in the vicinity of the affected host
nation (not all nations are surrounded by ocean). The
dilemma for the decision makers is which ships
should be deployed for the HADR mission once the
disaster has struck and the USN is expected to per-
form the mission.
The carrier ship that is the closest to the affected
country has certain capabilities such as aircraft sup-
port, search and rescue, medical and personnel sup-
port, storage of goods, and—importantly—fast transit
speed. However, carriers are the most expensive ships
(Apte and Yoho 2017). The next closest ship is an
Amphibious Assault Ship, which has capabilities
even superior to the carrier and costs almost one third
(the costs of the ships can be found in Apte and Yoho
2017, Moffat 2014, and Ures 2011). However, it is fur-
ther away. The carrier can reach the host country
sooner than the amphibious ship but would cost con-
siderably more and may or may not be able to fulfill
the demands of the disaster. The other ships could be
studied for their capabilities, proximities, and costs to
determine the tradeoffs among the attributes of all the
ships in the vicinity of the affected region. The ques-
tion then is which ship or ships should be diverted or
deployed from their current positions for the HADR
mission. The utility function can provide decision
makers with a tool taking into account the tradeoffs.
To develop this utility function, we turn to multiple
data sources to build a database of USN ships’ HADR
capabilities, their proximity to the affected region,
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2010 to FY 2017. First, we collect data from the Naval
Vessel Register (NVR), which is the official inventory
of USN ships that provides information on homeport,
berth, shipyard and other data fields for current years’
USN, Naval Reserve Forces (NRF), MSC, and RRF
ships. Our data are comprised of 59.5% (n = 1895)
USN vessels, 29.6% (942) MSC vessels, and 10.9% (346)
RRF vessels. We identify about 100 unique ship classes
in the USN inventory from FY 2010 to FY 2017.
We also use data from the IHS Markit (2018) (a glo-
bal information provider based in London), Jane’s
Fighting Ships; the official USN Fact Files; the MSC
Handbook; and Maritime Administration (MARAD)
ship pamphlets to calculate ship proximity to disas-
ters. We define proximity as the number of days it
would take an individual ship to travel from a given
location to a disaster location. Despite its ability to
respond on short notice, slower ship speeds may actu-
ally have a significant impact on the number of days a
ship will spend transiting to the disaster location rela-
tive to the number of days on station. To account for







where, T = the number of transit days required to
arrive on-scene at the disaster location; i = one ship
of a given class; d = ship distance from present posi-
tion to disaster location (nm, nautical miles);
s = ship maximum range speed in knots.
To capture capability of ships for HADR, we utilize
and build upon the data from Greenfield and Ingram
(2011) and Moffat (2014). Greenfield and Ingram
(2011) and Moffat (2014) identify the HADR capabili-
ties of various ship types. We use the same 0–2 value
categorization and capability variables, but update
the ship-type-level values in Greenfield and Ingram
(2011) and Moffat (2014) by turning to multiple other
data sources to create individual ship-level capability
metrics. We collect data from official USN fact files,
the MSC handbook, and the MARAD ship character-
istic pamphlets to both update and append unclassi-
fied ship class performance and HADR capability
metrics. In addition, data from Jane’s Fighting Ships
are used to supplement information from the official
factsheets. Table 1 defines the capability variables
and values we utilize in our analysis. For a more thor-
ough overview of the data collection efforts, see Car-
michael (2018).
Using this data, we employ factor analysis and con-
struct an ordinal index that captures vessel capability
for HADR. It is not possible to use all the variables
(more than 20) simultaneously to capture ship capa-
bility. Subsets of these variables are highly collinear,
making precise estimation impossible. To capture the
multiple ship attributes in a parsimonious way, we
construct indices of capability through factor analysis.
The goal of factor analysis is to reduce redundancy
among these multiple variables into a smaller number
of interpretable factors. The factors are constructed
using optimal weights that maximize the variance in
the data to retain the most efficient amount of statisti-
cal information. We discuss our interpretation of each
of the five factors below. For more details on the
method, see Rencher and Christensen (2012).
Our last data are individual ships’ reported operat-
ing and support (O&S) costs. O&S costs for each ship
come from the Navy Visibility and Management of
Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database,
which contains detailed, categorical cost and non-cost
data per ship by fiscal year, using VAMOSC 2017
USD values. The average annual amounts are con-
verted into average daily costs by ship class.
Using ship data on O&S costs, factor indices as met-
rics for ship capability, and calculated ship proximi-
ties to select disasters, we then calculate stylized
utility values for each ship class. The notion of utility
in economics is that of a measure of satisfaction or
well-being that a decision maker attempts to maxi-
mize, taking into account the tradeoffs in consump-
tion across goods and/or alternative uses of resources
(e.g., time and income). This same notion can be
applied to HADR scenarios in which a policy maker
seeks to maximize a notional measure of an objective
(e.g., mission goals, well-being of hurting population
seeking assistance), with attributes of the USN ships
(proximity, capabilities, costs) as the resources and
constraints in the optimization problem. To calculate
this HADR utility, for each ship class we generate:
½Ui;d;R;Ci;R ¼ ðSi  RiÞ  ðSi  Ti þ Aið ÞÞ ð2Þ
where, U = the calculated HADR utility of a given
ship or ship class; S = the ship/class Capability
Composite Score (CCS) or specific capability metric
score; Ri = the expected number of HADR response
days from “Day + 0” to the final expected day of
HADR operations; T = the number of transit days
from present position to disaster location; A = the
number of activation/preparation days required
prior to departure; Ci = vessel reported _AvgDly-
Cost_Class_FY2010_17 in Calendar Year (CY) 2017
USD.
This specification is a simple functional form illus-
trating the tradeoffs between ship capability, proxim-
ity, and costs. Recall that a ship’s cost C is reported
for each ship i and varies by the number of days in
transit. Also, a ship’s capability for HADR operations
will have a positive contribution to its utility the more
days it is available (higher R) and have a lower contri-
bution the farther it is (higher T, A). In calculating
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utility, a ship’s capability for HADR operations is
thus weighted by how available and proximate it is to
the mission. In essence, we generate utility and
response cost value pairs to best illustrate the trade-
offs without imposing restrictive functional forms on
the data. The function itself is a standard textbook for-
mulation of ordinal utility functions. Log-linearizing
the utility function (taking logs on both sides of the
equation) suggests we can linearly separate capability
S from proximity (measured by the number of days).
For our particular research question, this additive
separability of attributes is a standard and reasonable
assumption to make for illustrating tradeoffs. We dis-
cuss our results in the next section.
4. The Results
We performed factor analysis for capability of ships
because different ships have diverse capabilities. We
also did similar analysis for proximity implicitly.
Proximity depends on transit days T (given in Equa-
tion (1)), and different observed values of speed can
change these. Therefore, we performed factor analysis
for speeds. Costs were analyzed in relation to HADR
Table 1 Capability Variables and Definitions. Adapted from Greenfield and Ingram (2011)
Variable Variable definitions
NumberVerticalLiftAircraft = Maximum number of vertical lift aircraft that ship can have on deck at one time
Cap_AviationFacilities 0 Unable to support helicopter operations—No flight deck and no hangar
1 Some ability to conduct vertical lift operations—Has a flight deck but no hangar
2 Able to conduct sustained vertical lift operations—Has a flight deck and hangar
Critical mission capabilities
Cap_VerticalLiftScore = V1 times V2
Cap_LandingCraft 0 No ability to support landing craft
1 Some ability to support landing craft
2 Landing craft embarked, able to load/off-load cargo and store amphibious vehicles
Cap_Searchand Rescue 0 No embarked helo, unable to efficiently conduct SAR missions
1 Single embarked helo with communication equipment and night vision
2 Multiple helos embarked with communication equipment and night vision
Cargo capacity
Cap_DryGoods 0 No ability to store supplies beyond current ship use
Cap_RefrigeratedGoods
Cap_Freshwater 1 Ability to store some supplies beyond ship’s use
Cap_RollOnRollOff
Cap_FuelStorageDispens 2 Ability to store and transfer mass amount of supplies
Cap_SelfSufficient
Cap_PersonnelTransfer 0 No ability to support personnel transfer, slow speed vessel with deep draft
1 Ability to support personnel transfer for 15–29 personnel
2 High speed, shallow draft vessel with ability to transport 30+ personnel per voyage
Cap_FreshwaterProduction 0 No ability to produce freshwater beyond shipboard usage
1 Ability to produce and transfer 2000–5000 gallons per day (gpd) beyond ship usage
2 Able to produce and transfer >5000 gpd beyond shipboard usage
Cap_PersonnelSupport 0 Low crew number to support HADR mission (<50 personnel)
1 Medium size crew which can support HADR mission (51–200 personnel)
2 Large crew with ability to support HADR mission (>200 personnel)
Cap_BerthingCapacity 0 Little to no excess berthing or facilities (<30 racks)
1 Some excess berthing and facilities (31–50 racks)
2 Large number of excess berthing and facilities (>50)
Cap_MedicalSupport 0 No ability to conduct impatient medical treatments, no Medical officer embarked
1 Some medical support onboard, ability to support minor medical procedures
2 Medical officer embarked, ability to perform surgeries and hold several patients
Non-critical mission capabilities
Cap_TransitSpeed 0 0–18 knots max speed
1 19–24 knots max speed
2 25+ knots max speed
Cap_HydrographicSurvey 0 No ability to conduct hydrographic surveys
1 Some ability to conduct hydrographic surveys, soundings and chart building
2 Able to conduct hydrographic surveying, soundings and chart development
Cap_SalvageOps 0 No ability to conduct salvage operations
1 Some ability for lift and salvage operations in shallow waters
2 Heavy lift and deep water salvage operations capabilities
Cap_Towing 0 No ability to conduct towing operations
1 Ability to conduct emergency towing operations
2 Designed to conduct push, pull, or alongside towing operations
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capabilities. In what follows, the first subsection
describes the findings for all the attributes. In the sec-
ond subsection, we describe how a utility function
can help decision makers in understanding the
deployment or diversion of ships for humanitarian
missions. We illustrate this using data of response
from two disasters: the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the
2011 Tohoku earthquake. In the final subsection, we
describe secondary findings where we report the
results from two models based on regression analysis.
Here, we determine to what extent capability, proxim-
ity, and cost play a role in maximizing the utility of
HADR operations.1
4.1. Primary Findings
4.1.1. Capability Findings. As mentioned above,
we conduct factor analysis of the HADR capability for
the entire inventory of USN ships from FY 2010 to FY
2017. It is instructive to discuss these results that
underscore the specific capability variables for attain-
ing HADR missions.
Implementing the factor analysis shows that 91.7%
of the variation in the capability data can be explained
by retaining five factors. The five factors also all have
eigenvalues greater than the average, whereas further
factors do not. In accordance with standard criteria
for factor analysis, we thus retain the first five factors
in generating ship capability indices.
Table 2 reports the factor analysis along with the
factor loadings for each of the 20 capability variables
indicated by the row headings. For example, under
the column “Factor 1,” we see that 36.26% of the sta-
tistical variation in capability across USN ships can be
explained by this first factor (bottom cell indicating
“Proportion of Variance”). The values in the cells
under the “Factor” columns correspond to the weight
or loading of that variable in generating each factor
and range from a scale of 1 to 1, with the sign indi-
cating the direction of correlation. In the case of Factor
1, Dry Goods Capability loads particularly high and
positive at 0.93, whereas towing capability loads neg-
ative at 0.59. Meanwhile, capability for HADR tasks
such as vertical lift capacity and landing craft do not
load significantly at all (<0.4). In fact, the capability
variables that load particularly high on Factor 1 are
each related to cargo capability and capacity of the
ship. Thus, it makes sense that high Towing Capabil-
ity would reduce overall cargo capability and cargo
capacity of the ship.
On the other hand, for Factor 2, the variables that
reflect Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) capacity
of ships, landing craft, personnel transfer, medical
support, and search and rescue (SAR) capability are
those that load high. VTOL capability is in fact one of
the most versatile and universally requested USN
capabilities during HADR operations. VTOL of air-
crafts enable damage assessments, SAR operations,
personnel (including medical support) movement,
cargo transport, and clean-up in areas with damaged
infrastructure and obstructed roads.
Table 2 Capability Factor Analysis Results
Variable
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Uniqueness
All Ships (FY 2010–2017)
Cap_NumberVerticalLift 0.8768 0.1426
Cap_AviationFacilities 0.6467 0.4946 0.2142
Cap_VerticalLiftScore 0.8664 0.1695









Cap_FreshwaterProduction 0.657 0.4831 0.2349
Cap_PersonnelSupport 0.881 0.1269
Cap_BerthingCapacity 0.6755 0.5975 0.0543
Cap_MedicalSupport 0.8638 0.1198
Cap_TransitSpeed 0.4363 0.6395 0.3287
Cap_HydrographicSurvey 0.6501 0.5109
Cap_SalvageOperations 0.7493 0.3354
Cap_Towing 0.5884 0.4729 0.2785
Proportion of variance 0.3626 0.3431 0.1037 0.0579 0.0498
Cumulative variance 0.3626 0.7056 0.8093 0.8673 0.9171
Blanks represent absolute value loadings < .4
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The capability variables that load high for each of
the retained five factors thus have interpretability to
them. On the basis of the underlying capability vari-
ables, we interpret the capability factors as [Factor 1]
cargo capability, self-sufficiency, roll-on/roll-off
(RO/RO), and berthing capacity; [Factor 2] VTOL,
landing craft, and SAR; [Factor 3] hydrographic sur-
vey and salvage; [Factor 4] sea-based towing and air-
craft support; and [Factor 5] water production. In
addition, the order in which these various variables
loaded onto the factors suggest that cargo capacity is
the most important HADR capability (accounting for
36% of variance), followed closely by VTOL and SAR
capabilities (34%). Together, cargo capacity and
VTOL/SAR capabilities account for 70.5% of the vari-
ation in HADR capability, indicating its joint signifi-
cance and dominant capabilities in accomplishing
HADR missions. Capabilities such as hydrographic
survey and salvage (Factor 3, at 10.4%), towing (Fac-
tor 4, 5.8%), and water production (Factor 5, 5%) are
also important but considerably less so than cargo
capacity and VTOL and SAR capabilities.
4.1.2. Proximity Findings. As explained in the
section titled Data and Methodology, we use multiple
data sources to report the unclassified, open source
maximum speeds and range speeds of USN ships in
this study, and summarize them in Appendix I. Mis-
sion planners in a real-world setting could use actual
speeds that are appropriate for a given ship or class to
determine the number of required transit days. The
open source figures in Appendix I could very well
vary significantly from actual ship performance data
and are merely provided as a point of reference for
the subsequent utility analysis.
Appendix I shows maximum speed (Kts) and maxi-
mum range of speed (Kts). The summary statistics for
transit days that depend on the speed are given in
Table 3. For example, the mean observed maximum
range speed is 19.9 Kts, with a minimum reported
maximum range speed of six Kts and a maximum of
35 Kts. The observed mean maximum range is
10,583 nm. While most ships do not require any acti-
vation time, the ship class with the longest activation
time requires 10 days. The mean observed activation
time is 0.588 days.
Appendix I and Table 3 make evident that the cal-
culations of proximity depend on speed as given by
Equation (1). However, the data collected
(Appendix I) had different numbers for speed, maxi-
mum speed, and maximum range of speed. There-
fore, we analyzed the speed s using factor analysis to
compute T given s.
One of this study’s authors’ experience as an avia-
tor informs us that maximum range speeds for the
proximity calculations may provide the best chance
for traveling longer distances given a ship’s maxi-
mum fuel loads and mission loadout. The results of
our factor analysis confirm this. Only maximum
range speed should be used since nearly 72% of the
variation in the proximity data can be explained in
Factor 1 by maximum range speed alone. Overall
maximum speed is the only item in the second factor
greater than 0.4, but it has less weight than maximum
range speed. Thus, we elect to run all transit calcula-
tions and utility calculations using maximum range
speed.
4.1.3. Cost Findings. Figure 2 illustrates the rela-
tionship between HADR capability and average daily
O&S costs. Specifically, capability composite scores of
USN ships are depicted in blue on the right vertical
axis while daily O&S costs in red are on the left axis.
Ship classes are sorted by capability scores so that
classes with the least capability are on the left end of
the x-axis, whereas highest capability are on the right
end. Note that CVN-78 was commissioned only in
July 2017, resulting in lower than “normal” reported
FY O&S costs; future costs are expected to be in line
with current Nimitz class carriers (CVN 68). The same
figures for MSC and RRF ships are also available in
Appendix II. Figure 2 clearly shows the variation in
O&S costs across USN ship classes, with CVN68 class
ships costing more than $1.2 million per day, whereas
most USN ships’ average daily costs range from
$200,000 to $500,000.
4.2. Highlights and Illustration of Utility Findings
First, we note that the class utility score will change if
the desired transit speed is different than the speeds
given in collected data (Appendix I). The impact of
speed on utility can be seen in Appendix III. Table 4
Table 3 Proximity Summary Statistics—All Ships, FY 2010 to FY 2017
Variable
N Mean SD Min Max
All Ships (FY 2010–2017)
Prox_MaxSpeedKts 3183 24.5338 6.7882 6 50
Prox_MaxRangeSpeedKts 3183 19.8860 4.9644 6 35
Prox_MaxRangeNM 2720 10,583.2300 6749.2400 1200 21,000
Prox_DaysActivation 3183 0.5875 1.6772 0 10
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shows the attributes of ship types with highest and
lowest scores at 0 nm distance for a 10-day response.
However, it is interesting to note and important to
point out that as distance increases, scores cross over,
as illustrated in Figure 3. As distance increases, the
rankings change. As seen in Figure 3 for both LHD 1
and CVN 68 class ships, during a 10-day response,
the ranking crossover occurs at 3750 nm.
In Figure 3 the reported utility score for CVN 68
class ships is 162.9 points, and the cost is $12.41 mil-
lion (M), whereas LHD 1 class ships have a score of
142.2 points and a cost of $4.67 M. CVN 68 class ship
utility scores remain above LHD 1 ships as the
required distance increases because of the slower
LHD 1 class transit speed relative to CVN 68 class
transit speeds. We observe that cost comparisons can
be considered in situations in which the utility scores
of two ships are similar but costs are different where
we seek to maximize the provided HADR utility.
Next we illustrate utilities for a specific duration of
response. Figure 4 shows the utilities of all ships2 by
class for a 10-day response duration. An important,
unexpected yet logical finding from the similar fig-
ures in Appendix IV for 30-, 60-, and 90-day HADR
response is the following: response duration matters
for utility score calculation. For example, for a 10-day
HADR response, most ships possess zero utility
beyond 5500 nm, whereas all ships provide positive
utility during 60-day–90-day HADR response and at
5500–11,000 nm away. Green shading shows positive
utility scores at a given distance. Red shading indi-
cates zero utility score at a given distance and
response duration. In Figure 4 (and Appendix IV),
ship classes with highest utility at 0 nm are on the left
and lowest utility are on the right.
We highlight the results by applying these utility
scores to the HADR response data for the 2010 Haiti
earthquake (Apte et al. 2013) and the 2011 Tohoku
earthquake (Moffat 2014). LHA 4 provided the most
utility to Haiti during its 66-day HADR response, at
an estimated O&S cost of $25.7 M in CY 2017 USD
with 3233 utility points (Table 5). The calculated LHA
4 utility provided exceeds those provided by LHD 3
and 5 despite their higher Composite Capability
Scores (64 for LHDs as opposed to 50 for LHA) due to
LHA 4’s longer response duration. LSD 44 provided
the shortest Haiti response, yielding a utility pairing of
143 utility points and cost of $1.8 M. The lowest calcu-
lated utility pairing for the Haiti response was pro-
vided by T-ARS 51 during its 12-day response, yielding
an HADR utility of 54 utility points with a cost of
$0.584 M. In addition to having a very low cost, T-ARS
51 is one of the few USN inventory ships that can pro-
vide sea-based towing and conduct salvage and rescue
operations during HADR missions. T-ARS 51 serves as
a reminder that overall capability is not always the best
metric when considering which ships to task during
HADRmissions. Unique capabilities matter.
LHD 2 provided the most utility to Japan during its
28-day HADR response, at an estimated O&S cost of
$12.1 M in CY 2017 USD and 1430 utility points
(Table 6). T-AKE 4 provided the shortest Japan
response, yielding a utility of 78 utility points and cost
of $0.781 M. The lowest calculated utility pairing for
the Japan response was provided by T-AKE 4.
4.3. Secondary Findings
In addition, we conducted regression analysis of the
HADR response metrics to determine the extent to
which asset capability, proximity, and cost play a role
in maximizing the utility of HADR operations. We
estimated two ordinary least squares linear (OLS)
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Figure 2 United States Navy Capability vs. Average O&S Cost Per
Day, by FY 2017 Class (Hull Numbers) [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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LHD 1 CVN 68
Figure 3 Crossover of Utility Scores for LHD 1 and CVN 68 [Color fig-
ure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Apte, Bacolod, and Carmichael: Attributes Tradeoffs for Resources in HOCM
1080
Production and Operations Management 29(4), pp. 1071–1090, Published 2020. This article is a
U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA
response. The models are titled HADR (A) and
HADR (B) with a sample size of 47 ships.
The dependent variable for the HADR utility
regressions is a log linearized version of the calcu-
lated utility provided by HADR. The first OLS model,
HADR (A), controls for ship log linearized response
cost, number of transit days, number of total response
days, and Capability Composite Score (CCS).We omit
the variable for number of days on station during
HADR response to avoid collinearity. HADR (B)
replaces CCS in HADR(A) by response ship class to
measure what impact, if any, individual classes have
on coefficients. We do not include CCS to avoid
collinearity. We also eliminate LHD class since here,
both Haiti and Japan responses included LHDs and
they had the highest calculated CCS.
The HADR (A) coefficient for the response cost
indicates that holding everything else constant, a 1%
increase in response O&S costs is associated with a
0.1249% increase in total utility provided, at a 99%
confidence level. The HADR (A) coefficient for the
number of transit days indicates that on average, a 1-
day increase in HADR transit days is associated with
a 5.79% decrease in the total utility provided by
response ships, at a 99% confidence level. Further-
more, the coefficient for the total number of response
days indicates that on average, a 1-day increase in the
total number of response days is correlated with a
3.87% increase in the total utility provided by
response ships, also at a 99% level of confidence.
Finally, the HADR (A) coefficient for ship capability
composite score indicates that a one-point increase in
the capability composite score is correlated with a
3.26% increase in the total utility provided by
response ships at a 99% level of confidence. HADR
(A) reports an R2 of 92.1% with robust standard
errors.
The HADR (B) coefficient for log-linearized
response cost indicates that holding everything else
constant, a 1% increase in response O&S costs is not
statistically significant under robust standard errors.
Under non-robust standard errors, a 1% increase in
response O&S costs is associated with a 0.1127%
increase in total utility provided, at a 90% level of con-
fidence. The HADR (B) coefficient for the number of
transit days indicates that on average, a 1-day
increase in HADR transit days is associated with a
3.8% decrease in the total utility provided by response
ships, at a 99% confidence level. Furthermore, the
HADR (B) coefficient for the total number of response
days indicates that on average, a 1-day increase in the
total number of response days is correlated with a
4.19% increase in the total utility provided by
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Figure 4 Utility of 10-Day HADR Response by Class [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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expected, the HADR (B) coefficients for class utility
relative to LHD 1 class ships all indicate decreases in
total utility relative to LHD 1 class ships, at a 99%
level of confidence. HADR (B) reports an R2 of 99.1
with robust standard errors. Table 7 reports a com-
plete listing of HADR (A) and (B) model coefficients.
Table 5 2010 Haiti Earthquake HADR Response Ship Utility and Cost









CG CG 47 CG 60 1 22 23 220 4,296,613
CG CG 47 CG 52 1 20 21 200 3,392,109
DDG DDG 72 DDG 76 6 15 21 90 3,442,237
FFG FFG 7 FFG 36 0 35 35 350 3,096,840
LHA LHA 1 LHA 4 5 61 66 3233 25,681,862
LHD LHD 1 LHD 5 2 12 14 780 6,098,680
LHD LHD 1 LHD 3 14 14 28 910 13,751,710
LPD LPD 17 LPD 19 11 4 15 92 2,287,987
LSD LSD 41 LSD 44 0 11 11 143 1,803,997
LSD LSD 41 LSD 48 2 17 19 221 3,806,629
LSD LSD 41 LSD 43 5 17 22 221 11,202,770
LSD LSD 49 LSD 50 5 17 22 221 3,815,142
T-AGS AGS 60 T-AGS 63 7 49 56 294 2,413,972
T-AH AH 19 T-AH 20 4 51 55 561 5,492,085
T-AK AK 3008 T-AK 3009 1 38 39 570 2,927,142
T-AK AK 3008 T-AK 3011 5 18 23 270 2,569,926
T-AKE AKE 1 T-AKE 1 4 44 48 572 7,553,157
T-AKE AKE 1 T-AKE 2 0 15 15 195 2,417,308
T-AO AO 187 T-AO 198 4 27 31 297 3,698,783
T-AO AO 187 T-AO 195 6 18 24 198 2,628,176
T-ARS ARS 50 T-ARS 51 3 9 12 54 584,808
T-ACS ACS 4 T-ACS 4 10 42 52 378 247,652
T-ACS ACS 4 T-ACS 6 3 42 45 378 358,824
T-AKR AK 882 T-AKR 5063 5 17 22 119 317,519
Note. Source data for response ships, number of days in transit, and days on station adapted from Greenfield & Ingram (2011).
Table 6 2011 Tohoku Earthquake HADR Response Ship Utility and Cost





CG CG 47 CG 62 1 22 23 220 4,546,665
CG CG 47 CG 63 2 21 23 210 4,845,260
CG CG 47 CG 67 2 21 23 210 5,255,677
CVN CVN 68 CVN 76 1 22 23 748 23,581,838
DDG DDG 51 DDG 56 1 22 23 132 3,592,239
DDG DDG 51 DDG 62 1 22 23 132 4,388,412
DDG DDG 79 DDG 88 1 22 23 220 5,430,944
DDG DDG 51 DDG 54 1 23 24 138 3,636,537
DDG DDG 79 DDG 85 0 24 24 240 4,715,649
DDG DDG 79 DDG 89 2 21 23 210 3,764,518
LCC LCC 19 LCC 19 7 22 29 198 8,377,612
LHD LHD 1 LHD 2 6 22 28 1430 12,110,066
LSD LSD 41 LSD 42 6 22 28 286 3,819,775
LSD LSD 41 LSD 46 3 25 28 325 4,336,003
LSD LSD 49 LSD 49 6 22 28 286 12,950,246
HSV HSV 4676 HSV 4676 1 7 8 84 423,189
T-AKE AKE 1 T-AKE 7 1 14 15 182 2,020,978
T-AKE AKE 1 T-AKE 4 0 6 6 78 781,763
T-AKE AKE 1 T-AKE 9 3 20 23 260 2,645,257
T-AO AO 187 T-AO 197 0 17 17 187 1,449,992
T-AO AO 187 T-AO 204 0 23 23 253 2,255,366
T-AOE AOE 6 T-AOE 10 1 22 23 264 4,046,646
T-ARS ARS 50 T-ARS 50 10 15 25 90 1,015,765
Note. Source data for response ships, number of days in transit, and number of days on station adapted from Moffat (2014).
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We also conducted three comparative capability
factor analyses related to the two HADR responses
for Haiti and Japan. For the first set of tests, we lim-
ited the USN, MSC, and RRF inventories to include
ships in the inventory during the given HADR
response year. For the second set of tests, we con-
ducted factor analyses limited to those ships tasked to
provide an HADR response for each reported disas-
ter. The final set of factor analyses include both FY
2010 and FY 2011 inventory ships compared to all
ships tasked with providing an HADR response in
either reported disaster. The results of all three itera-
tions consistently indicate that there is a mismatch
between overall USN, MSC, and RRF inventory
HADR capability and what is sent to provide an
HADR response.
As discussed in the subsection of Primary Findings,
factor analysis results based on overall USN, MSC,
and RRF fiscal year ship inventory indicate that cargo
capabilities are the primary need that USN, MSC, and
RRF ships can fill, followed closely by vertical takeoff
and landing (VTOL), landing craft, and search and
rescue (SAR). However, the factor analysis results for
those ships sent to Haiti and Japan indicate that the
priorities were reversed! Tables 8–10 provide a com-
plete listing of the described HADR response capabil-
ity factor analysis results, contrasting capabilities of
the inventory of ships (left panel) vs. the ships that
were sent (right panel) to Haiti, Japan, and combined,
respectively. Results similar to this for MSC and RRF
are skipped in this article for brevity.
To highlight the reversal of capability priorities,
we discuss specific examples. Table 8 shows, consis-
tent with the primary findings above, that cargo
capacity followed by VTOL/SAR are the dominant
capabilities for accomplishing HADR mission among
the inventory of ships in FY 2010 (left panel). In con-
trast, the ships that were sent to respond to the 2010
Haiti earthquake (right panel) had a mix of capabili-
ties that were not closely aligned with what HADR
missions demand. For instance, in capability Factor 1
in the right panel, dry goods capacity loads at 0.44
and refrigerated goods capacity loads at 0.52. This
is the opposite sign and magnitude in the left panel,
Table 7 United States Navy Haiti and Tohoku HADR Response Regressions
Independent variables HADR (A) HADR (B)
HADR_log_Cost 0.1249*** [0.0394] 0.1127 [0.0939]
HADR_Enroute 0.0579*** [0.0113] 0.0380*** [0.0087]
HADR_OnStation [omitted—reference] [omitted—reference]




ACS 4 1.6671*** [0.3964]
AGS 60 2.4473*** [0.2652]
AH 19 1.9679*** [0.2247]
AK 3008 1.2801*** [0.1552]
AK 882 1.7771*** [0.3196]
AKE 1 1.5385*** [0.1481]
AO 187 1.5146*** [0.1393]
AOE 6 1.4609*** [0.0946]
ARS 50 2.2082*** [0.2545]
CG 47 1.6589*** [0.0879]
CVN 68 0.6181*** [0.1225]
DDG 51 2.1478*** [0.0993]
DDG 72 2.2451*** [0.1078]
DDG 79 1.6578*** [0.0890]
FFG 7 1.6894*** [0.1662]
HSV 4676 1.7234*** [0.2663]
LCC 19 1.8539*** [0.0702]
LHA 1 0.8130*** [0.2620]
LHD 1 [omitted—reference]
LPD 17 1.7358*** [0.1674]
LSD 41 1.4585*** [0.1065]
LSD 49 1.4848*** [0.0812]
Constant 2.3149*** [0.5500] 4.3973** [1.4604]
Observations 47 47
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.9205 0.9913
Note. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Bracket values represent Robust Standard errors.
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where dry goods load at 0.92 and refrigerated goods
at 0.93.
Table 9 reports similar shifting of capability priori-
ties in response to the Tohoku Earthquake. VTOL and
SAR capabilities were prioritized among the ships
sent to respond to Tohoku, with VTOL loading at 0.77
and SAR at 0.87 on this first factor (right panel). Capa-
bilities for Personnel Transfer was also prioritized,
loading at 0.79. However, the variables capturing
cargo capacity do not load on this first factor, and
some that do are in the opposite direction (e.g., refrig-
erated goods capacity loads at 0.44). These findings
are in contrast to the left panel, where refrigerated
goods loads at 0.93, personnel transfer at 0.5, and
VTOL/SAR do not load at all, on this first factor. One
might interpret these findings as indicating that
although the ships that responded to the Haiti and
Tohoku earthquakes had VTOL/SAR capabilities,
since these ships did not have as much cargo capacity
as those that could have been sent, the supply of relief
goods might have been severely and unnecessarily
constrained. A closer qualitative analysis for the
specific cases of Haiti and Tohoku would confirm
this. What the data we have and the quantitative anal-
ysis we have conducted do demonstrate, is the signifi-
cant mismatch in the HADR capabilities of the ships
that the USN sent to these crises, vs. the capabilities of
the ships in its inventory. There is a caveat, however,
since we do not know what ships were available to be
tasked nor do we know what the specific requests
were at the time the ships were tasked to provide sup-
port.
These findings go to the motivation of generating
the utility function. A utility function, as discussed in
our research, could have helped the decision makers
with sending the right ships by managing the tradeoff
between capability, proximity, and cost. Our decision
tool developed by making use of the utility scores
would have enabled the people in command to
deploy or divert ships that would have delivered
effective and efficient HADR.
In the past response to the Haiti earthquake capa-
bility composite score for LHD (64, the highest) is
clearly higher than that of LHA (50) with marginal
difference in cost per day. In Table 5 we can see that
proximity (days in transit) for LHA4 is five as
opposed to two for LHD5 and 14 for LHD3. Yet,
LHA4 has the higher utility score because this ship
stayed for longer time at the station. If LHD5 had
stayed longer, it would have provided more capabil-
ity at lower cost, thus yielding higher utility score. If
the planners had our framework for their use, they
could have realized the higher utilization.
As we carefully look at Table 8, we notice that in
the Haiti earthquake the capabilities of the ships
deployed have negative influence for Factor 1, the
most critical capabilities for HADR, whereas our
framework where all ships are included influence the
same capabilities with a high factor of >0.9. We see
similar results for Japan earthquake in Table 9.
Summarizing the results of secondary findings sug-
gest that although the sample size was small, the find-
ings are statistically significant and meaningful.
Results provided by HADR (A) show that on average,
while holding everything else constant, a one point
increase in ship capability composite score is corre-
lated with a 3.26% increase in the total utility pro-
vided by response ships, at a 99% level of confidence.
We also find that, on average, while holding every-
thing else constant, a 1-day increase in HADR transit
days is associated with a 5.79% decrease in the total
utility provided by response ships, at a 99% level of
confidence. HADR (A) also reports that while holding
everything else constant, a 1% increase in response
O&S costs is associated with a 0.1249% increase in
total utility provided, at a 99% confidence level. The
last finding from HADR (A) is that on average, while
holding everything else constant, a 1-day increase in
the total number of response days is correlated with a
3.87% increase in the total utility provided by
response ships, at a 99% level of confidence. HADR
(B) is observed to explain a slightly higher percentage
of the variance in the utility data. HADR (B), how-
ever, does not speak to the extent that asset capability
plays in maximizing the utility of HADR operations.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion mission planners need to consider O&S
and incremental costs during the decision making
process for deploying or diverting ships for HADR
missions to truly maximize utility, especially in cases
where two ships, or a combination of ships, have sim-
ilar utility ratings but significantly different O&S costs
(Table 4). In most cases, our research enables decision
makers to pick the cheapest option while providing a
high level of utility, selected from the available inven-
tory of ships. However, we want to point out that our
framework describes different solutions characteriz-
ing the tradeoff between different attributes without
prescribing a solution. Lower costs paired with high
capability ratings minimize wasted resources and
maximize relief provided to the affected population.
Applying our methodology to past disasters such as
Haiti and Japan earthquakes illustrates this finding in
Tables 5 and 6.
Our findings demonstrate that the duration of an
HADR response matters. Naturally, longer duration
responses are highly correlated with increased utility
and allow slower ships to respond within the given
timeline. However, longer duration responses are cor-
related with increased cost. To mitigate the impact of
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these increased costs, decision makers must select the
cheapest of the most highly rated utility ships to mini-
mize the required response duration while simultane-
ously reducing the cost per unit of utility provided.
Our observations of the past disasters, Haiti and
Japan earthquake shows that when utility scores cal-
culated by our framework of other ships that were at
the station for similar days are compared, one realizes
how our framework would have been useful if the
planners had one.
Our research also shows that proximity matters.
Any increase in the number of transit days detracts
from the utility provided to the affected population,
especially if the response duration is short. This is not
to say that the closest ships should be sent. The utility
graphs and tables clearly demonstrate that some ships
should never be sent in response to an HADR disas-
ter. Conversely, the same graphs and tables show that
it is better to wait on certain, more highly HADR util-
ity-rated ships. Every scenario requires careful analy-
sis of the available ships and we expect that decision
makers will use actual speeds that are appropriate for
a given ship or class to determine the number of
required transit days. Due to the classified nature of
the data, the values used in this research may vary
significantly from actual ship performance.
For brevity, we cannot provide all the tables (over
20) that are designed to provide decision makers with
quick reference tables. However, we have demon-
strated through the highlights provided in the previ-
ous section that our research will aid in selecting a
highly HADR-capable mix of response ships, based
on anticipated response duration, available ships, and
their respective distance to the disaster location. Each
disaster scenario is unique, as are the number, type,
and location of ships that are available for HADR
tasking. These unique features prevent a one-size-fits-
all answer to the question of providing a pre-planned,
optimal mix of ships that should be sent during an
HADR response.
Deploying or diverting a ship for humanitarian
missions in response to an emergent disaster is clearly
a complicated business, given the layered command
structures and the worldwide distribution of limited
ship inventories of each class. To respond quickly, it
is not uncommon for combatant commanders to
direct the closest ships, without the luxury of time to
fully consider how capable each ship is at conducting
the HADR mission or whether waiting for a more dis-
tant but more capable ship would be better. This type
of reactionary decision making can easily lend itself
to wasting valuable resources such as wartime assets,
funding, manpower, and readiness while providing a
suboptimal HADR response to the affected popula-
tion. In an environment of constrained resources, it is
important that these resources be used as efficiently
and effectively as possible when responding to disas-
ters around the world.
In summary, we used big data tools to analyze data
and to illustrate the tradeoffs among three attributes
for (i) picking the cheapest option when two assets
have similar capability. Based on our analysis we find
that (ii) response duration is highly correlated with
increased utility. We also find that (iii) proximity mat-
ters in all cases but especially if the response duration
is short. Although a disaster manager may perceive
these as intuitional observations, our data and analy-
sis validate them.
We have pointed out the usability and importance of
this framework to other military organizations
involved in HADR in the introduction. The applicabil-
ity of this research is possible generalization or adapta-
tion to other sectors that help in humanitarian
missions. For example, let us focus on one of the major
assets of an organization such as CAL FIRE, the fire
engines. CAL FIRE uses at least 14 different fire
engines. The capabilities of the engines depend on
many factors such as number of crew members that
can be seated, the volume of the booster tank, the
strength of the fire pump and usability of Class A foam.
The capacity for seating varies from three to six crew
members. The booster tank capacity varies from
500 gallons to 1200 gallons. The fire pump can be sin-
gle stage or two-stage, the capacity of which varies
from 300 gpm to 1000 gpm. The engine may or may
not have an auxiliary fire pump. All these factors deter-
mine the capabilities of different fire engines. The
weight limits on certain roads may hinder into the
capabilities due to the mass of the fire engine as well.
In summary, we can observe the parallels between dif-
ferent capabilities and levels of capabilities of the hard
assets of the USN, specifically ships, and the hard
assets of CAL FIRE, which are fire engines.
In our research, the ships have different transit
speeds based on their physical characteristics, which
in turn determine the proximity based on the number
of transit days the ship would take to reach the
affected region. Distance from the affected region, the
weight of the fire engine, and the recommended maxi-
mum speed can determine the proximity of the fire
engines in terms of transit time. Another factor in the
proximity calculation of the engines would be the
road the engine travels on. The transit time and the
proximity are determined by not only the weight of
the engine and the maximum speed the engines are
allowed, but also the type of road (highway, country
road, dirt road) and the gradient of that road.
The fixed cost of the fire engines, depending on the
class, varied from $300,000–$1 million in the recent
past. In the last 5 years, the costs have gone up sub-
stantially to $750,000–$2.5 million (approximately) for
a single fire engine. And this is the cost of an
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unequipped fire engine. The equipment adds at least
$50,000 to $100,000. In addition, the variable costs are
the salaries of the crew and the fuel costs, just to name
the basic costs.
This broad-brush information about another orga-
nization, CAL FIRE, shows the attributes of capabil-
ity, proximity, and cost for the hard assets, just as in
case of the USN. The data in the case of CAL FIRE are
vast and then, if organizations from adjacent states
are incorporated as well, the dataset increases multi-
fold. With wildfires across the country and resources
strained due to simultaneous demand, policy makers
can make more informed decisions if they are able to
take into account the resources of many more fire
departments. With that type of data we indeed are
looking at big data. The methodology used in our
research, developing a utility function by employing
factor analysis, will clarify for the decision makers the
tradeoffs between the attributes of the organization’s
assets.
The example of CAL FIRE shows that the findings
from the tool created for the USN can be adequately
modified to facilitate the decisions for other HOs,
such as CAL FIRE and food banks locally, and NGOs
and UN organizations worldwide. The methodology
and principles are the same; however, collection of
data may offer relevant utility quotients. Generaliza-
tion after all has many facets; it is not one size fits all.
For example, the organization we use to illustrate our
methodology is predominantly sea-based, and hence
proximity directly relates to time to relief. For organi-
zations like WFP or Medecins Sans Frontiere (MSF),
delivery of relief could be air-based. In that case,
proximity may be replaced by cost of rerouting and
rescheduling, and tradeoffs may simply be between
cost and capability where cost includes operating
cost, rerouting cost and rescheduling cost. Alterna-
tively, the decision-making framework could involve
a different set of attributes.
Notes
1Empirical estimates and tables are derived from Carmi-
chael (2018).
2Images of some ships are given in Appendix V for refer-
ence.
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